JORDAN

As a historic figure of stability in the Middle East, Jordan now finds itself in a highly complex position. Bordered by two failed states and with nearly all its neighbors engulfed in war, the kingdom directly suffers from the spillover effects, which actively contribute to its weakening. The expansion of these destabilizing factors places Jordan in a precarious, near-breaking position.

On the domestic front, Jordan faces a significant risk of social unrest arising from the presence of numerous refugee camps on its territory. These camps are predominantly populated by Palestinians (2 to 3 million), Syrians, Iraqis, and, to a lesser extent, Yemenis and Libyans. Consequently, Jordan has emerged as the primary country in the Middle East where the public overwhelmingly supports the Palestinian cause. This creates a distinct dissonance between the policy choices made by the government, such as the 1994 peace treaty signed with Israel, and the expectations of the Jordanian public. The evolving situation in Gaza directly impacts this segment of the population (mainly Palestinian refugees), who may be driven to express their anger against the Jordanian, Israeli, or U.S. governments through social movements. Depending on how the situation develops, these movements could escalate into violent actions.

In Amman, calls for demonstrations are primarily issued from the King Hussein Bridge. Protests regularly take place at the Al Husseini Mosque in downtown Amman, near the Al Kalouti Mosque, close to the Israeli Embassy in Rabieh, within refugee camps, near the U.S. Embassy, and across various neighborhoods in eastern Amman. Additionally, the Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps represent potential flashpoints, as the largest camps in Jordan. They predominantly host Syrian refugees. Close attention must also be paid to the al-Wehdat camp south of Amman (with nearly 62,000 registered Palestinian refugees) and the Baqa'a camp near Ein Al-Basha along the Amman-Jerash highway. Demonstrations targeting Jordanian policymakers primarily occur in front of the Parliament in the Abdali district and outside the Prime Minister’s office on Zahra Street, near the 4th crossroads. The largest gatherings typically take place on Fridays, following midday prayers.

Outside the capital, protests are concentrated mainly in the cities of Irbid, Kerak, Ma’an, Mafraq, Salt, and Zara. These demonstrations present a physical threat, any Western individual caught in such gatherings could be targeted, and their physical safety cannot be guaranteed. Furthermore, should protestors grow more vehement, they could directly target specific individuals (including foreign or Jordanian business leaders with ties to Israel, government ministers, politicians, and unsecured diplomatic personnel such as interns). These protests also trigger the deployment of police checkpoints, slowing down the flow of traffic and people.

If these demonstrations were to expand significantly, they could partially paralyze the country. Finally, these movements frequently target Western symbols perceived as complicit with Israel (such as Starbucks, McDonald’s…), placing an economic burden on these corporations. The property damage inherent to these riots could undermine long-term development prospects for these firms within the country. In the event of a quantitative increase in violence, « strategic » corporate sites, including production and industrial sites, could be deliberately targeted, compounding the economic risks weighing on an already fragile state.

The economic backdrop is indeed challenging. Native citizens are heavily impacted by the kingdom's economic fluctuations and see their purchasing power shrink whenever reforms are implemented. Deeply indebted to the IMF, the country is compelled to enact drastic economic reforms. A draft law aiming to increase taxes triggered widespread outrage (sparking the largest protests seen in five years). The law notably planned to tax lower-income brackets, prompting 3,000 people to gather near the Prime Minister's offices. In 2016, the IMF had approved a three-year, $723 million credit line for the kingdom. In return, Amman committed to implementing structural reforms and gradually reducing its public debt to 77% of GDP by 2021, down from 94% in 2015. Hosting hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees places a heavy burden on Jordan's economy. The fiscal project was intended to bridge this deficit by increasing personal income taxes by at least 5% and lowering the tax exemption threshold from 12,000 to 8,000 Jordanian dinars for individuals. This widened the tax base, disproportionately affecting the middle and working classes.

Furthermore, corporate taxes are set to rise by 20% to 40%. This issue is particularly sensitive. In 2012, protests over rising energy prices led some demonstrators to call for the departure of the King, an exceptional occurrence. Protests against the cost of living can represent a genuine destabilizing factor for the monarchy. The population, already vulnerable, bristles at these tax hikes and any reduction in purchasing power. Prices for basic commodities continue to rise while the Jordanian minimum wage remains stagnant. This unfavorable economic dynamic has been worsened by the collapse of tourism in Jordan (which saw a 70% drop in visitors according to the relevant ministry).

Any exploitation or manipulation of these movements to exacerbate economic hardships could seriously destabilize the Jordanian government. Moreover, if these economic difficulties deepen, further civil unrest is to be feared. The government frequently cites refugees as the primary cause of this over-indebtedness. Should the anger of native Jordanians turn against these populations, whether this narrative is verified or simply widely believed, it could trigger internal violence. Consequently, the major risk lies in a convergence of pro-Palestinian struggles and protests against the rising cost of living. These two causes currently mobilize two major pillars of Jordanian society : refugees and native Jordanians. An alliance between these two factions against the state would push mass numbers into the streets and could potentially lead to the fall of the government.

Compounding this state of affairs is the issue of the tribes. Jordan was established within colonial borders that anchored a heterogeneous mix of initially nomadic tribes onto a single territory. After decades of negotiations, legal frameworks, and administrative organization, these tribes now appear unified. However, these tribes operate on a clan-based political-sociological structure, and the traditional leaders who participated in this unification process are gradually passing away. These tribal elders are essential to Jordan's political life, serving as the link between the central power of the King and the local power under their control. Yet, the new generation of tribal leaders is challenging the established order and appears inclined to contest, or even sever, ties with the monarchy. As a result, the royal court could see its influence over these territories decline, posing a real risk of national fragmentation. The tribes, known for conditioning their support on specific grievances, could withdraw their allegiance to the King. In such a scenario, the three majority segments of the Jordanian population (refugees, native Jordanians, and tribes) could align their struggles. The central government would then lose all sovereignty over its population and the country.

Finally, Jordan is a country where illegal weapons are rampant, to the point where citizens hesitate to engage in public disputes for fear that the opposing party might draw a weapon in a fit of rage. This is partly explained by cultural factors inherent to Bedouin traditions. A 2014 study by Mahmoud Al-Juneid of the Jordanian Political Science Association showed that 21% of the population in Irbid owned a firearm : it is more than one in five people. In contrast, in the southern provinces, this rate reached 42%. According to former Interior Minister Salameh Hammad, the number of unauthorized weapons in circulation stands at an estimated 10 million, compared to just 350,000 licensed firearms. Furthermore, the procedure for legally acquiring a weapon has been simplified.

Purchasing illegal weapons is also remarkably easy, particularly via social media platforms like Facebook or Telegram. This omnipresence of firearms, combined with widespread public discontent, represents a tangible threat to the Jordanian state.

Regarding border security, the frontier with Syria is particularly critical, characterized by growing militarization driven by clashes within Syria, refugee inflows, drug trafficking, and social tensions, notably around the Zaatari camp.

The Iraqi border faces a rising threat linked to the withdrawal of pro-Iranian Shiite militias and the resurgence of ISIS, which increase the risks of infiltration, terrorist attacks, and destabilization. In response to these hybrid threats, which include aerial attacks via drones, Jordan must reinforce its counter-drone defense capabilities. Aerial threats appear to be a new, heavily utilized method of operation for terrorist groups seeking to destabilize the region. This reality contrasts with classical terrorist methods such as suicide bombings, shootings, and improvised explosive devices. The proliferation of civilian drones modified for military use poses genuine security challenges. These devices possess features that facilitate military conversion, such as cameras and communication systems, and can also be deployed as intelligence-gathering sensors. Jordan broadly faces an increasing threat from Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), even though it is primarily targeted by makeshift drones built by irregular groups in Iraq and Syria. These drones chiefly target border posts, Jordanian military personnel, and civilian populations, aiming to sow terror and pressure the Jordanian army into retreating inland, away from the border zones.

Furthermore, two distinct terrorist dynamics are emerging. Extremist groups are concurrently employing two tactics that strain the Jordanian state and force it to fight on two fronts. The first is traditional territorial expansion, similar to the strategy that allowed ISIS to establish its Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Jordan is actively fighting ISIS, which, following the fall of Mosul, seeks to rebuild an Islamic State and carve out territory. ISIS is capitalizing on the Jordanian-Syrian border area, the birthplace of the 2011 Syrian revolution, which was previously under the control of pro-Iranian Shiite militias from southern Lebanon, funded and supported by Iran to aid Bashar Al-Assad while his own army was deployed on other fronts. Following the fall of Bashar Al-Assad and the weakening of both Hezbollah and Iran, these militias vacated southern Syria. This initial vacuum left the field open for arms and drug traffickers, and subsequently for ISIS, which is exploiting the context to re-establish itself. ISIS notably hopes that security pressure will force Jordan to pull its troops back toward its hinterland.

The second front is internal, as the country suffers from the clandestine infiltration of its territory by ad hoc cells executing, or planning to execute, terrorist attacks. These cells also aim to destabilize society by exploiting its internal divisions. For instance, the Muslim Brotherhood, recently designated personae non gratae by Jordanian authorities after the disruption of a major attack plotted by a cell linked to the group, has been infiltrating entire neighborhoods in Amman, delivering sermons focused on the high cost of living and other sensitive topics. Concurrently, Shia cells also seek to carry out attacks in Jordan, utilizing southern Lebanon as a rear base. Although there have been no large-scale attacks on Jordanian soil since 2022, numerous plots have been thwarted. The evidence recovered consistently points to an influx of increasingly sophisticated weaponry, confirming the rising terrorist threat in Jordan.