JORDAN

In 2025, Jordan remains a symbol of stability in the Middle East, yet it finds itself in an increasingly complex and fragile position. Surrounded by failed or war-torn states on nearly all sides, Jordan bears the brunt of regional instability, which significantly weakens the Kingdom. The scale and persistence of these pressures place Jordan in a state of near-breaking point.

Domestic Situation:

Internally, Jordan faces a growing risk of social unrest, largely stemming from the presence of numerous refugee camps housing primarily Palestinians (estimated between 2 and 3 million), as well as large numbers of Syrians, Iraqis, and smaller populations of Yemenis and Libyans. As a result, Jordan is widely perceived as the most pro-Palestinian street movement in the region. A sharp disconnect exists between the political stance of the government—particularly its peace treaty with Israel (signed in 1994)—and the expectations of large segments of Jordanian society. The escalation in Gaza directly affects this population, especially Palestinian refugees, who may channel their anger at the Jordanian, Israeli, or American governments through social mobilisation. Depending on developments, such movements could turn violent.

In Amman, protest calls often originate from the King Hussein Bridge. Demonstrations typically take place at Al-Husseini Mosque in downtown Amman, near Al-Kalouti Mosque close to the Israeli Embassy in Rabieh, near the US Embassy, in refugee camps, and in various eastern districts of the capital. The Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps—Jordan’s largest—remain potential flashpoints, hosting mainly Syrian refugees. Additional tension-prone camps include Al-Wehdat (home to nearly 62,000 registered Palestinian refugees) and Baqa'a, near Ein Al-Basha on the Amman–Jerash highway.

Anti-government protests frequently occur outside Parliament in Abdali, near the Prime Minister’s Office on Zahra Street at the 4th Circle. The largest demonstrations are typically held on Fridays, following Friday prayers. Outside Amman, protests are concentrated in Irbid, Kerak, Ma’an, Mafraq, Salt, and Zara. These gatherings pose potential risks to personal safety—Westerners caught in such protests could become targets, with no guarantee of protection. Should the demonstrations intensify, foreign business leaders or Jordanian figures linked to Israel, ministers, or diplomatic staff lacking protection could be singled out. Protests also trigger police checkpoints, causing disruptions to transport and daily life.

If these protests were to escalate further, they could partially paralyse the country. Western symbols viewed as complicit with Israel—such as Starbucks or McDonald’s—may be targeted, placing economic strain on those companies. Vandalism associated with protests could undermine the country’s investment appeal, especially if strategic industrial or logistical sites are deliberately attacked.

Economic Pressures:

Jordan's economic environment is highly strained. Native Jordanians are increasingly impacted by shrinking purchasing power, particularly as austerity measures are introduced under pressure from the IMF. A proposed tax reform sparked the most significant protests in five years, with over 3,000 people gathering near the Prime Minister’s Office. The proposed law sought to tax even modest incomes, reducing the exemption threshold from 12,000 to 8,000 Jordanian dinars. It expanded the tax base to include more of the middle and working classes.

Corporate taxes are also set to rise from 20% to 40%, a particularly sensitive issue. In 2012, protests over fuel price hikes saw rare calls for the King's resignation. The rising cost of living remains a key destabilising factor. The population, already vulnerable in many respects, has little tolerance for tax hikes or erosion of purchasing power. Basic goods continue to increase in price, while the minimum wage remains stagnant. The collapse in tourism (–70% according to the Ministry of Tourism) has further weakened the economy. Any manipulation or instrumentalisation of the economic situation could dangerously destabilise the monarchy. Refugees are often scapegoated for the Kingdom's over-indebtedness, raising fears of potential internal violence should public anger shift towards these communities.

The most critical risk lies in the convergence of pro-Palestinian activism and anti-austerity protests. These two movements are driven by major pillars of Jordanian society: the refugee population and native Jordanians. Their unification against the state could result in mass mobilisation and potentially bring down the government.

Tribal Dynamics:

Jordan was founded within colonial-era borders that grouped a variety of formerly nomadic tribes. Despite decades of state-building and legal reforms, tribal identities remain central. Traditionally, tribal leaders have played a crucial role as intermediaries between the monarchy and local communities. However, a generational shift is underway. Younger tribal leaders increasingly question the established order and appear ready to sever ties with the central authority. This could erode royal influence in tribal territories and poses a real risk of national disintegration. The loss of tribal allegiance could lead all three dominant societal blocs—tribes, refugees, and native Jordanians—to converge in opposition to the state.

Security Environment and Weapons Proliferation:

Illegal firearms are widespread across Jordan to the extent that people reportedly avoid public arguments for fear their counterpart may be armed. This prevalence is partly rooted in Bedouin cultural traditions. A 2014 study by Mahmoud Al-Juneid found that 21% of Irbid’s population owned a weapon, rising to 42% in southern provinces. According to former Interior Minister Salameh Hammad, there are an estimated 10 million unregistered firearms in circulation, compared to only 350,000 legal ones. The legal acquisition process is also relatively simple.

Illegal weapons are readily available via social media platforms like Facebook and Telegram. Combined with popular discontent, this proliferation of arms presents a real threat to state stability.

Border Security and Regional Threats:

The Syrian border is especially volatile, affected by the ongoing Syrian conflict, refugee influxes, drug trafficking, and social tensions—particularly near the Zaatari camp. Jordan's border with Iraq faces increasing threats due to the withdrawal of pro-Iranian Shia militias and the resurgence of Daesh (ISIS), raising the risk of infiltration, terrorist attacks, and regional destabilisation.

Jordan is now confronted with hybrid threats, including drone attacks, and is compelled to bolster its anti-drone capabilities. Drones—especially modified commercial models—are increasingly used by terrorist groups to strike border posts, military personnel, and civilians. These Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) serve as both weapons and intelligence tools. Though most attacks currently involve rudimentary drones, their psychological and tactical impact is considerable, aiming to force Jordanian forces away from the borderlands.

Dual Threats from Terrorism:

Jordan is battling on two fronts. The first is territorial: ISIS seeks to re-establish a “caliphate” in the vacuum left by the withdrawal of Assad's forces and Iranian-backed militias from southern Syria. Jordan fears that pressure may force it to retreat from its border regions, allowing ISIS to expand.

The second threat is internal. Clandestine infiltration by jihadist cells intent on committing or planning attacks seeks to fracture Jordanian society from within. The Muslim Brotherhood, recently declared persona non grata by the state following the foiling of a major terror plot, is reportedly preaching in entire Amman neighbourhoods on topics such as the cost of living, stoking public anger. Shia cells are also reportedly planning attacks from safe havens in southern Lebanon. While no major attacks have occurred in Jordan since 2022, many plots have been thwarted. Confiscated weaponry is becoming increasingly sophisticated, reflecting the rising terrorist threat.